When children form a neighborhood club, the criteria for admission can seem arbitrary and elusive. Eligibility for entrance is often controlled by a small group of power-players who dispense the prestige associated with belonging. Those deemed worthy enjoy their special status, while outsiders can only hope that one day they might be welcomed by the “in” crowd.
Since the middle of the 20th century, the international community has had one such exclusive inner circle—the “nuclear club.” A bid to join the nuclear club is the geopolitical version of vying to play with the “big boys.” However, this is serious business far removed from child’s play. Along with the global prestige and power gained by acceptance to the cadre of nations armed with atomic weapons comes grave responsibility.
In August of 1945, the decision by the United States to use its newly acquired atomic technology on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in the arrival of the atomic age, and previously unknown devastation and danger. The U. S. State Department Web site describes the ramifications of the new nuclear reality:
The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of a
U. N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control.
But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and the Peoples Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear-weapon states. And increasingly it was becoming apparent that earlier assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate.
During the decade of the 1960s, developers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes unwittingly contributed to the concern over weapons proliferation.
Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium—a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 it was estimated that the quantity of plutonium being produced worldwide would make possible the construction of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily, depending on the level of the technology employed.
If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes was not prevented by an international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and if a growing number of nations came to possess nuclear weapon arsenals, it was believed that the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase.
Intense international efforts during the 1960s to prevent the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons technology culminated in the landmark Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed by 62 countries in July of 1968. The NPT now includes 180 signatory nations testifying to the international consensus for nuclear nonproliferation.
Currently, only five countries in the world—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and the Peoples Republic of China—are officially considered “nuclear weapons states.” Coincidentally, these five nations also serve as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
Since its inception several nation-states have sought, openly or otherwise, the strategic clout that admission to the nuclear club confers, but the continued effort of prospective members is worrisome to many in the world community. A nation’s eagerness to enter the nuclear club often engenders simultaneous anxiety and envy among its neighbors.
Some states seeking nuclear proficiency see the acquisition process as discriminatory, dictated by the whim of the U.N. permanent five. To these potential candidates permission to join the “nuclear club” appears capricious. Why are some nations permitted to possess nuclear weapons and others not? What are the criteria for justification and allowance of weapons of mass destruction?
Nations that possess nuclear weapons are eager to prevent expansion of the nuclear club. Many nonnuclear nations concur, but want to see a more determined emphasis on dismantling existing arsenals by their nuclear-armed neighbor states. In their view, proliferation is propelled by fear of vulnerability to nuclear intimidation.
As the scramble for clean, copious and cheap sources of energy to fuel the economic engines of the world intensifies, more nations are announcing the intention to develop atomic energy for civilian purposes. This renewed interest in nuclear energy is expected to produce electricity, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ease pressure on future energy prices. Nevertheless, there is considerable reluctance to risk allowing candidate countries to explore nuclear power for “civilian” programs for fear of discovering a covert parallel purpose with a “breakout” weapons potential.
Can countries with emerging economies be allowed access to nuclear technology to meet their energy needs without a resultant cascade of weapons proliferation? The current situation in Iran serves as a timely test case. The world community is watching closely, wary that the declared goal of nuclear energy exploration will be exposed as a clandestine cover for acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability.
The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is a well-respected independent think tank founded in 1958 in the U.K. to study “how to maintain civilized international relations in the nuclear age.” Mark Fitzpatrick currently directs the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program. On March 3, 2009, he testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the potential impact on the Middle East if Iran acquires an atomic weapon:
Since 2006, 15 countries in the Middle East have announced new or revived plans to explore civilian nuclear energy. They have justified their interest in terms of electricity needs, energy diversification, a desire to conserve oil and gas for export earnings, and the role of nuclear energy in retarding global warming. They do not talk openly about it in strategic terms, and certainly do not say they want nuclear energy as the building block for an atomic bomb. But they do see nuclear energy as a status symbol, and a way to keep technological pace with Iran. The question is how to keep this interest confined to purely civilian nuclear programs. Keeping Iran from getting nuclear weapons is the best preventative.
Nuclear power in itself is not a proliferation threat. It can contribute to proliferation risks by providing cover for clandestine activities and an industrial and personnel infrastructure that could be useful to a weapons programme. However, it is only the sensitive areas of the fuel cycle—primarily uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing—that pose the problem. If states agree to forgo these technologies and to accept enforceable transparency measures, then nuclear power can contribute to their economic development without sparking proliferation concerns.
Uranium hexafluoride is the feedstock used in the uranium-enrichment process. It can be enriched to low levels (LEU) to fuel nuclear reactors or high levels (HEU) for potential use in nuclear weapons. Can countries access the potential of the “peaceful atom” without giving into the temptation of nuclear armaments?
Countries determined to develop nuclear weapons can certainly evade the well-intentioned institutions of the current nonproliferation regime. In recent years the nuclear club has expanded to include India, Pakistan and North Korea as declared nuclear-weapon powers. And although Israel maintains a long-standing policy of ambiguity and opacity on this issue, it is widely regarded as possessing nuclear weaponry. These nuclear-armed nations are not parties to the Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
In addition, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton has concluded that the debate on how to deter Iran is over. Although much of the international community is apprehensive about Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing program nothing to date has been successful in deterring the Iranian government from its intention to develop the ability to build a nuclear weapon. The world seems reluctantly resigned to Iran’s admission to the nuclear club.
It would appear axiomatic that the world becomes an increasingly perilous place as additional nations seek to acquire nuclear-weapons capability. Nevertheless sovereign states repeatedly cite security concerns as a powerful proliferation driver. Some nations claim to seek nuclear-weapon capability as a defensive strategy, a safeguard against hostile ventures by surrounding states. This perspective suggests that preemptive attacks are averted if potential aggressors fear reprisal from their nuclear-armed neighbors. To ease tension and strengthen trust nonnuclear nations need reassurance that their self-restraint will be rewarded and result in enhanced safety for their citizens.
Tools to deter a nation from pursuing a proliferation program include diplomacy, economic sanctions and preemptive military strikes. It is generally assumed that if a nation’s interest in developing nuclear-weapon capability is rational then some form of diplomacy or economic sanctions will work to deter its efforts. The theory is that the world community can make the price too high by enforcing a robust regimen of restraints essentially resulting in international isolation. However, economic sanctions can be easily undermined if the required large-scale international consensus and cooperation is compromised, and if a country’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons is deemed irrational, efforts to deter are considered futile.
Of course, determining whether national interest or malicious ideology is the impetus behind an enrichment program can be difficult to discern. A lack of transparency increases the tension, setting in motion a sophisticated, high-stakes geopolitical game of “hide and seek.” Some suggest that strategic military strikes are the only viable option when a country can’t be deterred. Its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capacity must be contained or destroyed. But military strikes are dangerous and difficult and in the aftermath of an unprovoked attack, a country could rally support by citing the preemptive strike as proof why it needs nuclear protection from such attacks. Military action might delay a recalcitrant regime’s enrichment efforts while simultaneously giving it renewed resolve through the demonstrated threat to its territorial integrity.
Considering these factors might lead one to ask whether we are on the verge of a nuclear renaissance or an age of nightmarish ever-expanding nuclear–weapons.
Less than a decade after the first atomic test explosion, U. S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8, 1953, called for the ingenuity of man to be devoted to the promotion and preservation of life: “The United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”
Sadly, in spite of stated intentions humankind’s collective hearts and minds have not been able to ensure that atomic energy will be consecrated to life.
The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in May 2010 at U.N. Headquarters in New York. Participants will wrestle with ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and push for nuclear disarmament.
As the delegates convene, they will likely pass a statue that is prominently displayed on the grounds of the U.N. complex. Let Us Beat Swords Into Plowshares was presented as a gift from the then Soviet Union in 1959. It expresses a long-held hope of the Judeo-Christian ethic found in Isaiah 2:4: “They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, neither will they train for war anymore.” The Hebrew Scriptures foretell a future when nations will come together in a community effort to dismantle the weapons of war for peaceful purposes. All nations will eagerly enroll in the disarmament club.
The prophet Isaiah describes this as a time when all children can play together in peace. “All your children shall be taught by the Lord; and great shall be the peace of your children. In righteousness you shall be established; you shall be far from oppression; for you shall not fear; and from terror; for it shall not come near you” (Isaiah 54:13-14).
TOM FITZPATRICK
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